Centering U.S.-Palestine Relations on Shared Interests, Not Israeli Directives
By Mike Casey
Policy papers published by the IMEU Policy Project reflect their authors’ viewpoints.
Executive Summary
For many years, the United States has allowed the Israeli government to dictate the parameters of U.S.-Palestinian relations. The result has been escalating violence for Palestinians and Israelis, an ongoing illegal expansion of settlements in Israeli-occupied territory, and dwindling prospects for a peaceful resolution. The United States needs its own bilateral relationship with Palestine, centered around U.S. and Palestinian interests, and not simply pursuing Israeli government interests. This paper, written by a former Foreign Service Officer who worked in the Office of Palestinian Affairs and who quit his position in protest of U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinian people, lays out five recommendations to move forward and to redefine the U.S.-Palestine relationship. This paper does not present prescriptions for Palestinian self-determination.
Promote Palestinian human rights and engage fully with Palestinian society: Protecting human rights is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and Palestine should not be an exception. The United States cannot overlook issues such as administrative detention and prisoner abuse by the Israeli government against Palestinians. U.S. diplomats, senior officials, and members of Congress also need to meet and support all Palestinian human rights organizations, not simply those deemed acceptable to the Israeli government.
End settlement expansion and stop displacement of Palestinians: Settler violence is state-sponsored terrorism, and there is no U.S. interest in expanding settlements. Most administrations have condemned these practices regularly, but did little to stop them. As a start, the United States should subtract Israel's settlement budget from overall U.S. assistance, publicly reiterate that settlements are illegal under international law at every opportunity, and enact sanctions, visa bans, and a no-contact policy on those responsible for settlement expansion and settler violence.
Support Palestinian national and local elections: Palestinians have not had a national election since 2006. The United States, at the Israeli government’s behest, continues to support Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas’s illegal hold on power. Promoting democracy is a pillar of U.S. foreign policy, and the United States should support both national and local elections as a key part of Palestinian self-determination.
Improve governance for Palestinians: The United States continues to turn a blind eye to corruption, poor governance, and increasing authoritarianism from the PA. This stance is in large part due to Israeli government support for a PA which is weak, pliable, and a security partner in oppressing Palestinians. The United States needs to pressure the PA to undertake serious reforms on issues such as education, combating corruption, and security, to improve the lives of Palestinians in line with what they themselves also demand of their government, not to placate the Israeli government.
Reopen the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: This action would demonstrate U.S. commitment to a peaceful solution to the impasse, ensure policy makers in Washington receive critical reporting on Palestinian equities, and serve as a base for an independent bilateral relationship with Palestine.
Introduction:
For decades, U.S. policy towards Palestine has been viewed mainly as a sideshow to U.S.-Israel relations. The United States has, at times, engaged heavily with Palestinians in an effort to pursue a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. For many years, the United States was the largest donor to Palestinians, both via direct support and U.S. funding for UNRWA. Most of this engagement has been focused on ensuring Palestinian Authority acquiescence while Israel steadily changes the circumstances on the ground and erodes the possibility of a Palestinian state. The United States needs its own bilateral relationship with Palestine, focused on policies which support Palestinians and advance U.S. interests in the region.
The United States has always had a bias towards Israel and has never truly been a neutral actor. There have been times when the United States took steps to alter Israeli behavior on settlements, such as Secretary of State James Baker’s ultimatum in 1992 and President Obama’s abstention at the UN in 2016; however, these limited steps have been the exception to the rule of otherwise largely empty rhetoric devoid of policy consequences. The disastrous policies of President Trump and President Biden’s unconditional support for Israel, coupled with a continuing rightward shift in Israeli politics, have further shifted U.S. engagement with Palestinians to ensuring Palestinian Authority acquiescence as Israel commits genocide in Gaza, conducts violent military operations and large-scale land theft in the West Bank, and solidifies full control over East Jerusalem. Meetings with senior Palestinian officials focus on ensuring they continue to embrace non-violence, condemn terrorist attacks against Israel, and prevent any international actions against Israel at the UN or international legal institutions. The result has been the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians and more than one thousand Israelis, an erosion of the prospect of a Palestinian state and a just solution, and a decreasing quality of life for Palestinians.
The current guiding principle in U.S.-Palestinian engagement has been the pursuit of Israeli goals, even when they conflict with U.S. interests. The United States has condemned settlement expansion and settler violence for years, but has taken few steps to stop it from happening, outside of sanctions on a few violent settlers, which were immediately reversed when President Trump assumed office a second time. The Palestinian Authority has grown increasingly corrupt, authoritarian, and incompetent, but since this is what the Israeli government wants, the United States does little to correct it.
The United States needs its own bilateral relationship with Palestine, based on its own interests and not solely on the pursuit of Israeli government goals. Much like its goals in other countries around the world, the United States should pursue policies which increase stability, promote democracy, advance human rights, and improve quality of life. Given the high levels of control which Israel exerts over every aspect of Palestinian life, many of these policies will require engaging Israeli officials to make changes to improve the lives of Palestinians as long as they remain under Israeli military rule. Tough diplomacy will be necessary, including using the full set of economic and diplomatic tools to press the Israeli government to end settlement expansion and settler violence. A general shift in the United States’ approach that has allowed the Israeli government to dictate U.S. policies in Palestine will also be necessary; the excuse that “Israel will not allow that” cannot be invoked to veto policies such as support for Palestinian elections or U.S. engagement with Palestinian civil society.
Tough diplomacy will also be required with the Palestinian Authority. Meetings with Palestinian officials cannot consist of simply saying “it is not the right time” for any significant changes while asking them to remain silent in the face of daily violence and illegal land theft. The United States cannot continue to turn a blind eye to growing authoritarianism and poor governance as long as President Abbas remains committed to non-violence. Palestinians deserve peace and a government which looks after their needs.
Even before the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the war in Gaza which followed, violence against Palestinians was rising. 2023 was already on track to be the deadliest year for Palestinians since the Second Intifada, a record which had been broken previously in 2022 and before that in 2021. Settlement expansion and settler violence were also at all-time highs, as well as torture and abuse of Palestinians in Israeli prisons, many of whom have been held for months or years without charges. U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem steadily reported that the situation was unsustainable and growing increasingly volatile, but their warnings were not heeded in Washington. The October 7th attack was not inevitable, and there were many steps the United States and others could have taken to prevent it. Bold action will be required of U.S. officials and members of Congress to salvage the situation, to prevent the deaths of thousands more, and to maintain the possibility of Palestinians exercising their self-determination.
Recommendation 1: Promote Palestinian human rights and engage fully with Palestinian society
A key role for U.S. diplomats abroad is to provide decision makers in Washington with a complete picture of the situation on-the-ground in their host country. This reporting involves meeting with both official and unofficial contacts, covering the full spectrum of society. Crucially, diplomats need to be able to meet with groups critical of the host government.
Diplomats in Jerusalem are not able to meet with multiple groups in Palestinian society for no reason other than the Israeli government would be displeased. This prohibition applies in particular to six Palestinian NGOs, which happen to be the most prominent in Palestine: Addameer, Al-Haq, Defense for Children International - Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, Bisan Center for Research and Development, and the Union of Palestinian Women Committees. In 2021, the Israeli Ministry of Defense declared–without providing credible evidence–these six organizations to be front groups for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization. In 2022, Israeli forces raided these organizations, along with a seventh group, the Health Work Committees. Israeli soldiers confiscated their equipment, and in some cases, physically sealed off their premises.
The designation caught Washington policymakers by surprise, as well as officials in numerous European capitals. The Israeli government claimed at the time to have sent prior notification and evidence supporting the closures, but neither is true. Information provided after the fact was deemed insufficient by the U.S. government. At the time, State Department spokesperson Ned Price said: “What happened last year is the Israeli government designated these organizations…we have not followed through with any designations, nor have we changed our approach to these organizations.”
Price was correct in that the U.S. government did not change its approach to these groups, as even before the designations, diplomats were not allowed to meet with any of these groups out of fear of Israeli government criticism. The designations simply brought attention to the matter and led many to ask if the United States would take a stand by meeting with these groups despite the Israeli government’s accusations, as it would do in any other country. The State Department decided to follow the Israeli government’s decision even though the evidence did not support its claims.
It is no coincidence that these groups are the premier human rights organizations in Palestine, and are the primary groups documenting Israeli human rights abuses against Palestinians. In one telling example, former U.S. official Josh Paul told media that Israeli forces raided the offices of Defense for Children International - Palestine the day after the State Department approached the Israeli government over credible accusations that Israeli police had raped a 15-year-old Palestinian child in custody. Reports from these groups are also used extensively each year in the State Department’s Human Rights Report, but no U.S. official would dare meet with them. Diplomats in Jerusalem were even scolded if they inadvertently spoke to anyone from these groups on the sidelines of a diplomatic reception. It is worth noting that there is no actual policy which says U.S. diplomats cannot engage with these groups, but Washington has always denied permission for any engagements with them. Other Western diplomats meet with them on a regular basis, with some even providing funding to their organizations.
Subsequently, the United States further pushed itself away from any meaningful contact with leading Palestinian human rights organizations. In September 2025, the State Department imposed sanctions on three such premier organizations – Al-Haq, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights – because of their involvement with cases seeking to hold Israeli officials accountable for their actions at the International Criminal Court. The sanctions were imposed under Executive Order 14203 and have had devastating consequences for the human rights organizations targeted. For example, Al-Haq reported the closure of its bank accounts and the loss of U.S. employees, donors, and partner organizations, along with draconian social media restrictions. Not only is it increasingly difficult for the U.S. government to engage Palestinian civil society; sanctioning these organizations also makes it increasingly difficult for U.S. civil society to maintain and develop relations as well.
This no-contact policy is reflective of two major shortcomings in U.S. policy. First, the inability to engage with prominent civil society groups in Palestine prevents diplomats from providing Washington with the most accurate and complete information possible. These restrictions are not limited to these groups and do not apply only to diplomats in Jerusalem. Visiting U.S. officials and members of Congress regularly ask for “civil society” or “outside of the box” meetings with Palestinians for their visits; inevitably, they end up meeting solely with PA officials and perhaps some Palestinian business leaders for fear of angering the Israeli government.
With a Palestinian-focused bilateral relationship, U.S. officials and members of Congress should decide which groups to meet in order to gain a better understanding of the situation in Palestine, and not only meet with those deemed acceptable to the Israeli government. The United States would not allow a third party to dictate with whom it can engage in any other country, and Palestine should not be an exception. Officials and members of Congress should also prioritize meeting with Palestinians during visits to Jerusalem. The vast majority of Congressional visits do not include meeting with a single Palestinian, and even visiting State Department officials fret that having “too many” Palestinian engagements will lead to criticism from the Israeli government. On one particular visit, diplomats in Jerusalem were told to cancel a Palestinian civil society meeting with Secretary Tony Blinken, as three Palestinian engagements, compared to eight with Israeli officials, was deemed too excessive by Washington. The reasoning provided was that so many Palestinian meetings would lead to complaints from the Israeli government or attacks in the Israeli press, neither of which are insurmountable obstacles to American diplomacy. This lack of engagement with Palestinians leads to a limited understanding of Palestinian issues; again, the United States should determine its own engagements, not the Israeli government.
The second major shortcoming revealed by the meeting restrictions is a general disregard for Palestinian human rights. Issues that would garner significant focus in any other mission are generally ignored when it comes to Palestinians. Abuse of Palestinian prisoners by Israeli authorities was extensive before October 2023, and has only become more widespread and widely reported since then, including in U.S. media. Diplomats in Jerusalem have documented these abuses in internal reports as well; however, U.S. engagement on the issue is very limited. Recent high profile reports did lead to some statements of condemnation and investigations at the tail end of the Biden administration, but it is highly unlikely the Trump administration will address these issues further.
The use of administrative detention - where individuals are detained for months and years at a time without trial or even charges - is another area where the United States remains silent in Palestine, despite being very vocal about this issue in other countries. This practice is growing increasingly common, with Israeli NGO B’Tselem reporting over 3,300 Palestinians in administrative detention in December 2024, far beyond the peak of 960 reached during the Second Intifada in 2002. This number includes hundreds of children, as well as American citizens. While administrative detention is not entirely illegal under international law, Amnesty International and other human rights groups have determined that Israel’s arbitrary and excessive use of administrative detention, as well as the fact that nearly every prisoner held under administrative detention is Palestinian, has violated the requirement that this practice only be used rarely and for imperative security reasons. Despite the illegality of the practice and the negative impact on Palestinian lives, the United States does not raise this issue with the Israeli government. In recent years, it has never appeared as a talking point in any briefing papers for visiting officials.
The lack of U.S. focus on human rights in Israel and Palestine is also problematic within Israel itself. There are current efforts underway to increase taxation, require intrusive registration requirements, and criminalize any cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) for NGOs in Israel, all efforts designed to prevent criticism of human rights abuses by the Israeli government. Rather than pushing for transparency, the United States’ response has been to deny funding to human rights groups in Israel and to impose sanctions on the ICC. The United States’ refusal to recognize even the potential for human rights abuses by the Israeli government continues to have detrimental consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Recommendation 2: End settlement expansion and stop displacement of Palestinians
There can be no progress towards a peaceful solution to Israeli-Palestinian issues without an end to settlement expansion and the violence it requires. Ending settlement expansion and Israel’s violent regime to maintain settlements is not just about protecting territory, but about saving lives. Palestinians face daily violence from settlers, and the security restrictions needed to allegedly “protect” settlements, including checkpoints and settler-only roads, disrupt lives by leading to long wait times and dehumanizing treatment at checkpoints, as well as circuitous routes which can add hours to even the simplest of trips.
To be clear, settler violence is state-sponsored terrorism. Violent settlers are a proxy militia that the Israeli government uses to displace Palestinians as part of its steady destruction of the possibility of a Palestinian state. Settlers are armed by the Israeli government - often with U.S. weapons - and the Israeli military protects them during attacks, while also sometimes participating directly. The entire settlement enterprise is funded by the Israeli government. Violent settlers are rarely detained or charged following attacks, because the Israeli government chooses not to do so. This lack of action is a clear political decision. The Israeli military has the capability to track down those responsible, as evidenced by the detention or killing of any Palestinian who commits violence, usually within 24 hours of the attack. Settler violence is state-sponsored terrorism in every sense of the word.
Displacement is not limited to the West Bank. Nearly the entire population of Gaza remains displaced, with Israeli troops planning to remain inside areas of Gaza constituting roughly a third of the strip on a permanent basis, regardless of troop withdrawals elsewhere. Evictions and demolitions occur on a daily basis in East Jerusalem, with Palestinian families removed from homes in which they have lived for generations. Often, these homes are immediately occupied by Israeli settlers or incorporated into larger settlement building projects. Viewed from hilltops around Jerusalem, clear lines emerge showing that settlement blocs are strategically built to cut off Palestinian neighborhoods from larger Palestinian cities such as Bethlehem and Ramallah.
There is zero U.S. interest in settlement expansion. Most administrations have condemned it at every opportunity, but have done little to stop it, and the United States continues to provide full support to the Israeli government regardless of its policies of expansion and its use of settler violence as a means to achieve state goals. Some of the minimal steps taken by the Biden administration, including sanctions against violent Israeli settlers, were immediately reversed by President Trump at the start of his second term. These sanctions were a step in the right direction but were too small to really make an impact. Biden administration officials also made it clear that secondary sanctions against Israeli government agencies and businesses that supported these violent settlers were not going to happen, limiting Israel’s sense of the gravity of these sanctions.
Beyond addressing violence, the United States needs to pressure the Israeli government to announce and maintain a moratorium on both settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as ending demolitions in East Jerusalem. It also needs to commit, regularly and publicly, to not establishing a long-term presence in the Gaza Strip. There is, again, no U.S. interest in expanded Israeli settlements and ongoing land theft.
The United States will have to take economic and diplomatic steps to convince the Israeli government to end settlement expansion and settler violence. Some possible steps include:
Subtract Israel's settlement budget from overall U.S. assistance: There is no reason for the United States to subsidize settlement expansion and settler violence, both of which it has regularly condemned. In 2024, this budget was nearly $1.3 billion, according to Israeli NGO Peace Now. The full cost of Israel’s settlement enterprise is often muddled among several parts of the Israeli government budget (costs for roads under transportation, security under defense, etc.). This opacity is partially due to basic governance and bureaucracy, but the true cost is also intentionally masked as the rising cost of living in Israel (Tel Aviv was recently ranked as the world’s eighth most expensive city) has caused a growing number of Israelis to question why the government focuses on building settlements in areas under occupation rather than affordable housing in existing Israeli cities. While Palestine is already subject to one of the highest number of special Congressionally-mandated reports in the world, a mandatory report on the amount Israel spends on settlements each year would help drive reporting on this issue and prevent U.S. diplomats from being silenced by senior leadership in Washington when reporting on settlements and settler violence.
Reiterate that settlements are illegal under international law: In February 2024, then-Secretary of State Blinken reversed the so-called Pompeo Doctrine, which had upended decades of U.S. policy by stating that settlements were not illegal under international law. The U.S. government must clearly and continuously reiterate its position on the illegality of settlements. The United States should not stand in the way of any international action to stop settlements, including using its veto power at the UN Security Council. Ideally, this would apply to any international fora; if Israel continues to expand settlements in contradiction of international law and U.S. policy, the United States should not exert diplomatic efforts to protect Israel from international scrutiny.
Sanctions, visa bans, and a no-contact policy: As mentioned above, while the Biden administration took steps to sanction violent settlers, it refused to take action against senior Israeli officials and businesses involved in settlement expansion and funding. This further step is necessary to truly make an impact. It will be a painful process and cause rifts between the U.S. and the Israeli government, as well as with U.S. businesses, as these sanctions will involve otherwise “legitimate” Israeli businesses which nonetheless are involved in funding settlement expansion and settler violence. The Biden administration did refuse to meet with certain far-right Israeli politicians, many of whom wore this restriction as a badge of honor, but the no-contact policy needs to go deeper and wider across the Israeli government to cover anyone with a tangible link to settlements. While seemingly small, sanctions and visa bans are effective tools given the perceived close nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
Recommendation 3: Support Palestinian national and local elections
Palestinians have not had a national election since 2006; no Palestinian under the age of 36 has ever voted in a national election. While an election is not a complete cure for Palestinian governance issues, a credible, transparent, inclusive, and internationally-recognized national election is a critical step towards national unity and Palestinian self-determination.
PA President Mahmoud Abbas continues to deny national elections at every opportunity, seeking convenient excuses to prevent what he sees as an election that his ruling Fatah party will lose. Abbas’s definition of a loss, in this case, is anything less than the complete, unopposed power he now yields. He is currently 19 years into a four-year term. Beyond the endless canceling of elections, most recently in 2021, Abbas continues to take other increasingly authoritarian steps to hold onto power, including weakening the judiciary, dissolving the legislature, and directing security forces against his critics.
The United States has accommodated Abbas’s continued illegal hold on power. Any talk of a Palestinian election is instantly shut down by Washington officials, though diplomats in Jerusalem regularly argue for its necessity. Even local elections are met with trepidation. The United States did not oppose local elections in the West Bank in March 2022, but was unwilling to issue a statement in support of them. A proposal for local elections in Gaza in 2023 also received a tepid response from Washington officials, despite the likely outcome of removing Hamas from local governance and allowing increased international engagement in Gaza. While issues of succession are sometimes raised during engagements with Abbas, U.S. officials rarely raise elections prospects with senior Palestinian officials.
Promoting democracy is a pillar of U.S. diplomacy across the world, outside of Palestine. The primary reason is that the Israeli government does not want an election, or a strong Palestinian government in general. Abbas has proven himself to be a pliable partner for the Israeli government, speaking out but taking little concrete action. Abbas and his inner circle know that as long as they continue to advocate publicly for non-violence and cooperate with Israeli security forces, they can take any authoritarian steps or corrupt actions they choose.
The stated reason for U.S. and Israeli opposition to a Palestinian election is to prevent Hamas coming to power, as occurred during the 2006 election. Recent polling does show that Hamas, while its popularity is decreasing, remains the most popular Palestinian political party. This popularity does not translate directly to electoral victory, and Hamas is unlikely to win a majority or even a plurality in a national election. While Palestinians might support Hamas’s “resistance” to Israel’s occupation, few would vote in support of its governance credentials. In 2006, Hamas’s ability to govern was relatively unknown; now, it has shown a penchant for corruption, authoritarianism, and gross mismanagement of the Gaza Strip.
Hamas itself also does not seek a total victory in elections. The group seeks to gain a position of influence without responsibility, a perhaps difficult task but a pragmatic one. Hamas has no interest in governance, as shown during its years ruling Gaza. Hamas also recognizes that holding too much power will be detrimental and lead to a severing of international funding and diplomatic engagement. Consistent with its shura model, Hamas also seeks a government of consultation between parties, not dominated by any single faction, including Hamas itself.
While polling data shows that Hamas would not win a majority, or even a plurality, of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, that does not mean that there will be no Hamas representation following an election. President Abbas, the Israeli government, and the United States will continue to oppose any election in which Hamas participates, but to hold an election without Hamas participation would be seen as illegitimate by Palestinians, given its popularity. Hamas will win some seats in an election, and this is something that all parties involved need to recognize and accept. After an election, the United States can determine how it will work with a newly elected government with elements from Hamas, but that is not sufficient justification to block an election entirely.
Policymakers in Washington also often default to the excuse that Israel “will not allow” a Palestinian election to proceed if it includes Hamas. This denial would include direct action to stop an election, such as denying voting in East Jerusalem or arresting candidates in the West Bank and Gaza before or after an election. The decision to hold an election is solely in the hands of Palestinians, and the Israeli government has no right to deny them. The United States should, as it would do in any other country, support the electoral process and exert necessary diplomatic pressure on the Israeli government not to interfere in the process.
Recommendation 4: Improve governance for Palestinians
The PA, and its dominant party Fatah, remain immensely unpopular among Palestinians. Much of this is due to the degrading security situation; however, the PA also fails to provide basic services to Palestinians under its jurisdiction, in addition to taking steps which are increasingly corrupt and authoritarian.
The Israeli government often demands the PA undertake certain reforms before it will release clearance revenues or “allow” the PA to play a role in Gaza’s future. However, the driving force for reform under a Palestinian-focused policy should be making life better for Palestinians, not meeting Israeli demands.
As an example, the United States should support efforts to modernize the Palestinian curriculum in order to improve the quality of education for Palestinians. This effort would focus primarily on increasing and updating the amount of STEM materials and removing outdated information, such as gender roles depicted in books. The Palestinian Ministry of Education has conveyed this need and should be the leader in determining what materials require updating. The United States, along with other international donors, should provide funding and expertise to enable these changes. The topic of education materials is very sensitive in Palestine, and supporting a Palestinian-led process, rather than simply applying pressure to implement changes, is key to overcoming public resistance.
While Palestine often ranks low on corruption indexes compared to its neighbors when it is included as a non-state, corruption ranks high among complaints from most Palestinians. It often takes the form of nepotism rather than outright theft of public funds, given the constant dire financial situation of the PA. Corruption also benefits heavily from Israel’s occupation, as anyone who controls access to Israel for the movement of people or goods stands to benefit heavily from their position. This is of course by design, as Israel seeks to maintain control over Palestinians daily lives by leaning on a handful of corrupt middlemen.
The PA has taken some steps to superficially address corruption in a seeming attempt to deflect what limited Western criticism it has faced on the issue. The Anti-Corruption Commission has a shiny new office building, competent staff, and an extensive system for Palestinians to report corruption in person, over the phone, or online. It does not, however, have the political support necessary to make any major corruption arrests, and serves primarily as a method for Abbas to target political opponents.
As a corrupt PA is considered desirable by the Israeli government, the United States puts little emphasis on anti-corruption efforts. Despite reporting from the Office of Palestinian Affairs on how important this issue is to average Palestinians, senior U.S. officials have typically dismissed it as a non-issue. Secretary Blinken occasionally raised the issue during general talking points about the need for reform in meetings with President Abbas, but without significant diplomatic pressure, Abbas has no plans to address corruption.
The issue of corruption is but one of the many examples in which the United States offers weak criticisms and general calls for reform, but does not press the issue further. Jerusalem-based diplomats regularly compiled lists of needed reforms, from combating corruption to streamlining the health care referral system, yet there was little effort from Washington policymakers to pressure the PA to implement any of these changes. The U.S. government also uses a lack of reforms as a justification for the continued denial of recognition of the State of Palestine at the UN. Following a recent U.S. veto, then Deputy Permanent Representative Robert Wood said: “We have long called on the Palestinian Authority to undertake necessary reforms to help establish the attributes of readiness for statehood and note that Hamas, a terrorist organisation, is currently exerting power and influence in Gaza – an integral part of the State envisioned in this resolution.” In short, the United States does not pressure the PA to reform, but uses a lack of reforms to block Palestinian statehood. To be clear: self-determination for the Palestinian people is their inalienable right; lack of PA reform cannot serve as a pretext for the denial of this right.
Security coordination and training is also a pillar of U.S. interaction with the PA, and was one of the few areas to continue receiving funding under the first Trump administration despite cuts to funding for USAID, UNRWA, and others. This support focuses primarily on targeting Hamas and other militant groups, is designed to bolster Israel’s security, and, conveniently, help Abbas to target his political rivals. Much U.S. and international training supports this model, which is focused primarily on high-risk arrest operations and tactical training. This role for the PA Security Forces (PASF) is important, but it cannot be the sole focus of U.S. law enforcement training efforts. Palestinians are also in need of law and order within their own cities, with a focus on community policing. This is especially true in Gaza moving forward, as people need somewhere to turn in order to address grievances, such as enforcement of property ownership. The U.S. Security Coordinator and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement in Jerusalem are both capable of providing this type of training and assistance.
The United States also cannot turn a blind eye to blatant human rights abuses by the PA. Oftentimes, these abuses are overlooked, especially if they serve Israeli government interests, such as the violent suppression of protests. Some abuses are even more egregious, such as the killing of human rights activist Nizar Banat in 2021, who was beaten to death by PASF officers in his home. Despite some initial interest, U.S. officials in Washington have largely ignored his case, though diplomats in Jerusalem continue to attend the trials and report on the issue. The more recent banning of Al Jazeera in the West Bank in January 2025 is another example of the PA doing all it can to stifle dissent, with little to no reaction from the United States.
While these are all serious issues that should be addressed, let’s be clear: Palestinians also need safety from violent Israeli settlers and the Israeli military. Safety for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories can best be assured through the ending of Israel’s military occupation and the illegal policies it employs to steal Palestinian land for purposes of colonization.
Recommendation 5: Reopen the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem
For decades, U.S. policy has focused on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The United States, however, only recognizes Israel as a state, not Palestine. U.S. diplomats must put the word “Palestine” in quotes even when writing internal diplomatic cables. Seemingly endless settlement expansion, designed specifically to disrupt a contiguous state, has compressed Palestinians into ever-smaller “islands” within the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Gaza Strip, while devoid of settlements since 2005, has had nearly its entire population displaced since October 2023, with Israeli plans for a permanent reduction in territory and a continuing military presence. Many insist that the two-state solution is no longer feasible, and a one-state solution with equal rights is the only path forward. Others still argue a “confederation” model, similar to the EU, is a possibility.
The United States must recognize that there is still a military occupation going on and final borders are yet to be drawn. This recognition involves, in an initial step, reopening the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem. The consulate was shuttered by the Trump administration in 2019 as part of its efforts to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and wholly subsume U.S. policies toward Palestinians under the U.S.-Israel relationship. This step was joined by the so-called Pompeo Doctrine, which declared that settlements were not “per se” illegal, and U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.
The closure of the consulate signified that there is no bilateral U.S.-Palestinian diplomatic relationship, and all U.S. policies in the area are focused on Israel. Palestinian issues were covered under the “Palestinian Affairs Unit”, which was placed under the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. As such, any reporting on Palestinian issues needed to be cleared by the ambassador, resulting in a suppression of accurate, on-the-ground reporting. Cables on issues such as settler violence were simply not approved for release, preventing the U.S. government from having a full understanding of the situation in Palestine. Reporting on forced displacement of Palestinians from Masafer Yatta was labeled as “antisemitic” by embassy leadership. In another instance, a report on a settler attack, which included photos taken by a U.S. diplomat of a blood-stained pillow from a house where a settler had attacked a three-year-old child as she slept, was considered “too radical.” Without a free reporting chain, diplomats were unable to convey important information to Washington officials on Palestinian equities.
The Biden administration rebranded the “Palestinian Affairs Unit” as the “Office of Palestinian Affairs” in 2022, and while OPA remained administratively part of the embassy, it was granted an independent reporting stream. The Biden administration did, eventually, reverse the Pompeo Doctrine in February 2024, making the announcement in a low-key fashion at an event in Argentina after three years of debating it. An additional step under constant consideration–reversing a decision made under the first Trump administration allowing settlement products exported to the United States to be labeled falsely as “Made in Israel”–was never finalized.
Unfortunately, the Office of Palestinian Affairs’ independent reporting stream was taken away shortly after the start of the second Trump administration, again preventing diplomats in Jerusalem from accurately reporting on issues affecting Palestinians. This reporting was especially crucial in the days and weeks following the October 7, 2023 attack. Diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in Israel were essentially silenced by their leadership, who preferred simply parroting the Israeli government’s narrative rather than allowing diplomats to do actual reporting work. Nearly all of the cables which accurately represented the situation on the ground came from the Office of Palestinian Affairs during this time. Without this separate reporting authority, Washington policymakers will lose the necessary independent information they need for accurate decision making.
Despite campaign promises to do so, the Biden administration did not succeed in reopening the consulate. Very little effort was put forward to do so. Despite initial discussions with the Israeli government, visiting senior officials from Washington told U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem that no serious talks on reopening the consulate had occurred at any point. One senior official noted that many in Washington were afraid of Israeli government retaliation, such as declaring the U.S. Ambassador to Israel persona non grata and forcing him to leave the country. The reaction to this possible outcome would be, clearly, for the United States to reciprocate by removing Israel’s ambassador to the United States if needed. While the United States cannot simply impose its will on the Israeli government and force the reopening of the consulate, U.S. senior officials were not willing to even have discussions on the matter.
The United States should also recognize and consider Palestinian equities when making decisions. A key example is choosing the site for construction of a new embassy in Jerusalem. While a final decision is still pending, there are strong indications that the United States could choose a location which is widely known to be land Israel expropriated from Palestinians, including from U.S. citizens of Palestinian background. While any location in Jerusalem will generate controversy, the United States should recognize these sensitivities and do its utmost to address them.
Reopening the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem would demonstrate U.S. commitment to Palestinian self-determination, ensure Palestinian equities are reported to Washington, and reinforce the fact that East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza are occupied areas for a potential future Palestinian state. Short of reopening the consulate, the State Department should immediately reinstate the Office of Palestinian Affairs’ independent reporting channel to ensure policymakers in Washington have the necessary unfiltered information to make appropriate decisions. U.S. officials and members of Congress should meet with Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank during their visits, and with Palestinians in Gaza whenever possible, including virtually. Visiting these locations not only provides crucial perspectives, but also demonstrates U.S. interest and commitment. In particular, officials and members of Congress should visit sensitive locations, such as the homes of Palestinian-Americans targeted for demolition in East Jerusalem, or those which have been attacked by settlers in Turmus Ayya or Huwarra.